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VIDEOTAPING LIVING WILLS: DYING
DECLARATIONS BROUGHT TO LIFE
WILLIAM R. BUCKLEY*
Accompanying the technological advancements of the twentieth cen-
tury has been the debate among legal, medical, and religious scholars as to
one's right to choose death when faced with a terminal affliction or "vegeta-
tive" condition. Under such circumstances, life-sustaining medical care is
available to perpetuate existence, but the prognosis for recovery is virtually
hopeless.
In the early 1970s, legislatures and judiciaries began wrestling in ear-
nest with "living wills" in which terminally ill patients authorized their doc-
tors, in the popular vernacular, "to pull the plug" and allow a natural and
imminent death without prolonged suffering. The expression "living will"
was initially coined by Luis Kutner in 1969.' Legal commentators have
subsequently generated substantial analyses that elaborate the concept.' In
* A.B., Indiana University, 1980; J.D., Indiana University, 1983. Partner, Buckley,
Buckley, & Buckley, Lafayette, Indiana.
I. Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539
(1969).
2. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
-AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS (1983); J.
SMITH, HOSPITAL LIABILITY §§ 13.01-13.04, at 13-1 to 13-45 (1985 & Supp. 1987); Blodgett,
New "Living Wills": Changes in Statutes Sought, 72 A.B.A. J,, Sept. 1986, at 24; Hallagan,
Natural Death Act & Right to Die Legislation, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 301 (1986); Kolb,
Indiana's Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, 19 IND. L. REV. 285 (1986); Kor-
nreich, Who Will Decide Whether to Withhold or Withdraw Extraordinary Medical Treat-
ment? The Constitutional Right to a "Living Will," 6 PROB. L.J. 33 (1984); Kutner, The
Living Will. Coping with the Historical Event of Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 39 (1975); Mar-
tyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally Ill. The Living Will and
Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779 (1984); Mooney, Indiana's Living Wills and
Life-Prolonging Procedures Act: A Reform Proposal, 20 IND. L. REv. 539 (1987); Reaves,
Living Wills: Uniform Law Proposal, 70 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1984, at 29; Simpson, The Living
Will: A Matter of Life & Death, 125 TR. & EST., April 1986, at 10; Note, The "Living Will".
The Right to Death with Dignity?, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 485 (1976); Comment, A Right
to Choose Death, 13 CUMB. L. REV. 117 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, A Right]; Note, In re
Living Will, 5 NOVA L.J. 445 (1981); Comment, The Living Will: Already a Practical Alter-
native, 55 TEX. L. REV. 665 (1977); Comment, The Right to Die a Natural Death and the
Living Will, 13 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 99 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Natural Death]; Note,
The Right to Die: A Proposal for Natural Death Legislation, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 228 (1980);
Annotation, Living Wills: Validity, Construction, and Effect, 49 A.L.R.4th 812 (1986); AM.
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1976 California enacted the first Natural Death Act,' and thirty-seven
other states and the District of Columbia have followed suit through Sep-
tember, 1987."
Contemporaneous with these developments was a mechanical innova-
tion that remains unapplied to the living will arena. Videotape became
widely affordable and available with the appearance of videocassette re-
corders (VCRs) in the 1970s and the 1980s. Videotaping a person who
elects "the right to die" if savaged by an incurable malady seems to be a
logical extension in today's age of telecommunications. A video living will
truly enables the terminal patient to describe his decisions more directly
and intimately than any written statement. The patient's recorded image
revitalizes the instruction process for both the family and the physician in
the manner closest to actual speech. Despite these expedient characteristics,
no statutes empower videotape recordings to function as living wills.
This article will illustrate the benefits of videotaping living wills. Evi-
dentiary considerations, statutory archetypes, and practice pointers shall be
suggested. Production criteria and videotape vulnerability will also be
discussed.
JUR. 2D, NEW Topic SERVICE Right to Die; Wrongful Life §§ 1-62 (1979 & Supp. 1987)
[hereinafter AM. JUR. 2D, NEW Topic SERVICE].
3. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1987).
4. The state living will statutes include: ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to -. 100 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-
95 (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509
(1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 to -. 15
(West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-4101 to -4112 (Harrison 1986); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 327D-I to -27 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp. 1987); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, para. 701-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE §§ 16-8-1 I-I to -
22 (Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A. I to -.11 (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to -. 10 (West Supp.
1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-31 (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1986);
Mo. ANN, STAT. §§ 459.010 to -.055 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to
-206 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to -.690 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1
to H:16 (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320
to -323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-11 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§
97.050 to -.090 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1 1-101 to -I 10 (Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h
(Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 5251-62 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to -:12 (Supp. 1987); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to -.905 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10
(1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to -. 15 (West Supp. 1986); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-26-
144 to -152 (Supp. 1987).
[Vol. 22
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I. LIVING WILLS DEFINED
A living will is a document in which a legally competent adult indi-
cates her desire to forego or conclude life-sustaining medical treatment in
the event she becomes incapacitated by a terminal ailment.5 The instrument
typically becomes operative only upon (1) the development of an incurable
or irreversible condition demanding life-sustaining care without which
death would, in the physician's expert opinion, promptly and ultimately re-
sult;0 (2) the preparation of a written and duly executed living will; (3) the
communication of such a declaration to the patient's attending physician;7
and (4) the physician's "qualification" that the patient suffered a terminal
5. A. BUCKLEY, INDIANA LAW & E.M.S. 109 (1985); J. SMITH, supra note 2, § 13.04,
at 13-37; Kutner, supra note I, at 551; Annotation, supra note 2 at 813; AM. JUR. 2D, NEW
Topic SERVICE, supra note 2, at § 32 (1979).
6. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-3(6), -4 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010, -. 100(7) (1986);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3202 (1986); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
7187(0, 7188 (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-103(10), -104 (Supp. 1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570(3), -571 (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§
2501(e), 2502-03 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421(6), 6-2422(a) (West Supp. 1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 765.03(6), 765.04(1) (West Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-3 (Supp.
1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4503(3), -4504 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I i0-1/2, para.
701-02(0 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE §§ 16-8-11-8, -9, -14 (Supp. 1987); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 144A.2(8), 144A.3 (West Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
40:1299.58.2(8), 1299.58.3(A)(I) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§
2921(8), 2922(3)(B) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601(f), -(g) (Supp.
1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010(6), 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
50-9-102(7), -103(1) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.590, -.600 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 137-H:2(VI), -H:3 (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-2(F), -3 (1986); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3102(8), 3103 (West Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-20(d), -
30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-103(8), -(9) (Supp. 1986); UNIF.
RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY ILL ACT §§ 1(9), 3, 9A U.L.A. 506, 509 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5252(5), 5253 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:2, -:3 (Supp. 1987);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.020(7), -.030 (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(8),
154.03 (West Supp. 1986).
7. ALA. CODE. § 22-8A-4(b) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010(b) (1986); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-3202(B) (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(1) (Supp. 1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422(b) (Supp. 1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 765.04(2) (West Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-8 (Supp. 1986); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 10- , para. 703(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE § 16-8-11 -11 (e)
(Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.3(2) (West Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299:58.3(B)(I) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2922(3)(A) (Supp.
1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(b) (Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
115(1) (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.015(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-9-103(2) (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:5 (Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 32-11-104(b) (Supp. 1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp.
1987); UNIF. RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 3, 9A U.L.A. 509 (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1110 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5256 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE
ANN. § 54-325.8:3 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(c) (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
154.03(l) (West Supp. 1986).
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illness and is presently unable to render treatment decisions.' Copies of the
writing usually must be incorporated into the declarant's medical record.9
Prior judicial approval is generally unnecessary to implement a living will.1o
The substantive ingredients of a living will differ between the states; conse-
quently the legal ramifications vary among jurisdictions. One universal pro-
vision in all current legislation demands that all valid living wills must be in
writing. Thus, under current state laws, a videotape of a declarant indicat-
ing her wishes to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining medical care would
mereiy serve as ordinary evidence of the patient's intent. Such video record-
ings would not be accepted as independent living wills.
For the majority of clients, an ordinary written living will will suffice.
In certain cases, however, videotape could be a valuable evidentiary supple-
ment. Occasionally, a client opting for "the right to die" will be vehemently
8. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-6 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.030, -.100(6) (1986); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3204(A) (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-107 (Supp. 1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2425 (Supp. 1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 765.03(5), 765.07(1) (West Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-10 (Supp.
1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10-h, para. 706(a) (Smith-Hurd Stipp. 1987); IND. CODE § 16-8-
11-14(a) (Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.5 (West Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.7(A) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2922(3)(B), (C)
(Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-604(a) (Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §
41-41-113 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-9-102(6) (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:2(V), -H:6(I) (Supp. 1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-5 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b)(1) (1985); OKLA STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 3107 (Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.083 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
77-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); UNIF. RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 3, 9A U.L.A. 509
(Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:2 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
70.122.030(2) (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-5(a) (1985).
9. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(b) (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010(b) (1986); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-3202(B) (1986); COLO REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(1) (Supp. 1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422(b) (Supp. 1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 765.04(2) (West Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-8 (Supp. 1986); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. I 10-1h, para. 703(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE § 16-8-11-11(e)
(Supp. 1987); IOwA CODE ANN. § 144A.3(2) (West Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1299.58.3(3) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2922(2) (Supp. 1986);
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(b) (Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-115(1)
(Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.015(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
9-103(2) (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:5
(Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.070(2)(a) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-104(b)
(Supp. 1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1987); UNIF. RIGHTS OF
TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 2(c), 9B U.L.A. 614 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1110 (Supp.
1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5256 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:3 (Supp.
1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(2) (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3(c)
(1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.03(I) (West Supp. 1987).
10. For the common law basis for this principle, see, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984). Cf., A.B. v. C., 124 Misc. 2d 672, 477
N.Y.S.2d 281 (1984) (dictum) (guardian could seek judicial approval to enforce incompetent
patient's living will). A.B. v. C. involved a written living will in which the declarant also had
prepared a videotape recording. Id.
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opposed by family members who wish to countermand the living will. In a
flurry of motions, an attorney for these relatives will seek injunctive relief
until'a hearing can be held to determine the validity of the document. The
declarant's state of mind, intent, and execution of the instrument will be
challenged. For the incurably ill patient who truly desires life-sustaining
treatment to be withdrawn, the living will must promptly quash such at-
tacks. A videotape recording showing the declarant reciting the living will
and executing the will provides compelling evidentiary ammunition.
II. A VIDEO LIVING WILL PROTOTYPE
Once a client determines that a videotape is desirable, counsel should
prepare a written living will in the form endorsed by statute. A recording
session should be scheduled "in the field" or at the production facilities.
Healthy clients may elect to record in their homes or, alternatively, at the
video firm or the attorney's offices. Hospitalized patients will necessarily
require on-site filming, and this presents administrative complications such
as securing advance permission to videotape inside the hospital. Appropriate
video equipment must be obtained for the particular recording location.
During the filming, the declarant, the required witnesses, the attorney, and,
if practical, the physician should be present. For recordings in advance of
illness, the family physician is the suitable medical professional. At the hos-
pital, the attending physician should participate. Once the camera begins
''rolling," the individual making the medical treatment declaration should
introduce herself and the others present, explain in detail the purpose of the
videotaping, specify any particular decisions regarding medical care, and
recite the written living will. If the declarant is hindered by her affliction
and cannot deliver such lengthy speeches, a "designated speaker" may con-
duct the recitation and prefatory remarks. The declarant then should re-
quest the witnesses' signatures, and declarant and witnesses should converse
to demonstrate that the document is intended to operate as a living will and
that each person is signing as a voluntary action. The lawyer may wish to
orchestrate this discussion to guarantee performance of any legal precepts.
The writing should then be executed with careful attention to the proce-
dures required under state law. The execution of the instrument should be
painstakingly filmed to document statutory compliance. After recordihg has
been completed, copies of the videocassette should be made for the patient,
the physician (to be included in the patient's medical record), the attorney,
the video company, the family, or as otherwise advised.
Depending upon the evidentiary rules of each jurisdiction, camera op-
erators or other video production personnel may need to execute affidavits
attesting that (1) the video equipment was capable of recording at the time
of the session and operated satisfactorily, (2) the operator was competent,
(3) the videotaping was voluntary and/or at the request of the declarant,
1987]
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and (4) the activities recorded are a true and accurate representation of the
events as they actually transpired."
III. FUNCTIONS OF THE LIVING WILL AND THE SUPERIORITY OF
VIDEOTAPE
As a mechanism to implement one's "right to die," living wills effectu-
ate the declarant's constitutionally protected right of self-determination and
autonomy over personal medical treatment decisions.12 Courts have fre-
quently held that these constitutional interests stem from privacy"s or the
free exercise of religion. 4 In addition, a living will allows the terminally ill
II. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. For a sample operator's certification docu-
ment, as used for videotaped depositions, see Michael J. Tabas, How to Conduct a Videotape
Deposition, Supplemental Materials, Lectures before the Seminar on Videotaping Legal Pro-
ceedings, National Network of Legal Video Companies, Inc., New York City, New York, July
II, 1987.
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980);
In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert.
denied sub norm., Garger v. N.J., 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Suenram v. Society of Valley Hosp.,
155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977); Scholendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y.
125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976); A.
BUCKLEY, supra note 5, at 109; J. SMITH, supra note 2, § 13.01, at 13-3 to -4; Cantor, A
Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the
Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228, 236 (1973); Comment, A Right, supra note 2,
at 118-19.
Bartling involved a patient wishing to be disconnected from a ventilator. The declarant
had executed a durable power of attorney as well as a videotaped deposition which was admit-
ted into the record during enforcement proceedings. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); In re President & Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Burger, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del.
1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass.
App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985); In re Quack-
enbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); Suenram v. Society of Valley Hosp, 155
N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (1977); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northamp-
ton County Ct. 1973); J. SMITH, supra note 2, § 13.01, at 13-5 to -8; Borst, The Right to Die:
An Extension of the Right to Privacy, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 895 (1985); Comment, A
Right, supra note 2, at 120-24; Comment, Natural Death, supra note 2, at 101-09; AM. JUR.
2D, NEW Topic SERVICE, supra note 2, at §§ 10-11 (1979 & Supp. 1987), Cf., Foster v.
Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983) (dictum) (questioning right of privacy to refuse
life-saving treatment).
14. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Montgomery v.
Bd. of Retirement of Kern County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 33 Cal. App. 3d 447, 109
Cal. Rptr. 181 (1973); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972); St. Mary's Hosp. v.
Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. App. 1985); In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d
435 (1965); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1984); In re
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patient to indicate lucidly her wishes against the continuation of life-sus-
taining treatment should the patient become incapable of communicating
overtly. The instrument establishes a permanent record from which the
health care provider and family may clearly ascertain the patient's desires.
Having a properly executed writing minimizes the risk that thoughtful rela-
tives, with the best of intentions, will prevent disconnection of life-support
systems and preclude consummation of the declarant's desires. A duly exe-
cuted document also protects against fraudulent attempts by dispassionate
relations to euthanize an afflicted relative prematurely in order to reap es-
tate benefits or avoid crippling medical expenses.
By providing a uniform statutory procedure for documenting and im-
plementing a living will, the potential liability of the health care provider or
another involved party is limited. Physicians are less hesitant to terminate
life-sustaining care if the legislature has shielded them from culpability
when acting in good faith to comply with a dying patient's orders. As a
consequence, medical liability insurance premiums should be lower, and, to
some degree, the cost of medical care should be relieved.
A videotaped version of the living will also accomplishes these objec-
tives. The terminally ill individual is afforded the opportunity to decide her
own destiny. Her wishes are explicitly expressed on an accessible record
available to the hospital, to relatives, and to judges for confirmation. As
long as one complies with the pertinent law, and the jurisdiction has a pro-
vision limiting liability for good faith performance, any living will, whether
on paper or magnetic tape, will insulate the medical profession or other
participants from culpability. Videotape actually furnishes a superlative de-
fense for the doctor involved. Significantly, the visual document provides
more definitive evidence that the physician acted upon express instructions
when deciding to cease life-sustaining measures.
The videotaped living will offers special advantages. The video record-
ing supplies a visual nexus between the declarant and the document so that
intentions are crystallized and mental competency is undeniably demon-
strated. With videotape, the terminal individual literally addresses the phy-
sician, her family, and-if necessary-the court, even after personal com-
munication becomes impossible. A written declaration simply states a
disembodied desire to end treatment. The videotape "revives" the patient
and her recommendations. Furthermore, there can be little question as to
proper execution of the written living will if the events are video recorded.
Also, videotaped living wills render fraud virtually unachievable at least in
the instance of counterfeit substitutes. Bogus living wills with wishes con-
Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962)
(common law rule); In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); In re Melideo, 88
Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976).
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trary to the patient's cannot survive the compelling testimony of the actual
declarant "on camera."
IV. WRINKLES IN THE VIDEO APPROACH
The introduction of videotape into the living will formula could result
in Hollywood-style productions saturated with pathos and emotional inflec-
tions. Frequently, plaintiffs in personal injury cases who employ video re-
cordings of "days-in-the-life," depositions of medical experts, or accident
reconstructions cast the presentations in heavy emotionalism to manipulate
juries or inflate settlement prospects. In the living wills context, a videotape
could display an exaggerated scenario of the pathetic, agonizing patient,
helpless against the inevitable consequences of her deteriorating condition,
who attempts to avoid a hellish continuation of misery through a last, gal-
lant quest for dignity. Out come the handkerchiefs!
It is certainly natural for any intelligent person to suspect the values of
anything which appears on a television, but it is improbable that videotapes
of dying declarants would be doctored to reflect melodrama. The introduc-
tion of videotape into living wills does not alter the fundamental objective
sought by such statements: the clarification, in a legally enforceable form,
of a person's hope to preclude an existence which merely prolongs an incur-
able disease and the appurtenant discomforts. There are no multi-million
dollar recoveries hanging in the balance as is true with many personal in-
jury cases. The living will can normally be activated without prior judicial
approval,16 so there often is no trier-of-fact to influence. Since the living
will contemplates extremely unpleasant circumstances, it would seem ridic-
ulous to heighten the grief and sadness of the declarant, her family and
friends by engaging in a videotaped gesture of tasteless theatrics.
A related issue focuses upon the question of dignity. Why would a ter-
minally ill individual wish to appear on videotape in a degenerating physical
condition? For some, the opportunity to record their living, breathing image
beyond death will be a temptation to their egos. Admittedly, the video re-
cording could be something of a keepsake through which surviving relatives
could remember the declarant, but it is difficult to leave such a message
while on one's deathbed. For those sensitive to such considerations, it would
be wise to videotape a living will while still healthy. However, many people
do not execute such documents until the situation has become critical. Ulti-
mately, videotape is not appropriate for everyone, but that should not alto-
gether disqualify its use.
Revocation poses another query. If a person prepares and executes a
valid living will, but later chooses to rescind the document, many statutes
15. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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establish a cancellation procedure. In most states, abrogation is accom-
plished in three ways: (a) physical destruction of the living will; (b) com-
munication of the patient's repudiation to the attending physician; or (c)
insertion of the countermand in the patient's medical record. 6 Under some
laws, revocation may be achieved through any manner that clearly deline-
ates the intention.1 7
Assume that videotaped living wills are valid under any state law. At
first glance, the video instrument may seem difficult to revoke, but a video-
taped living will may be annihilated just as easily as its paper counterpart.
Similarly, the declarant need only execute a new writing or videotape that
cancels the original video living will. Repudiation by extermination or a
superseding document are not barriers to video use.
One major obstacle to videotaped living wills is the requirement to in-
clude these documents in the patient's medical records. Hospitals usually
file a written living will along with the declarant's charts, physician's re-
ports, and medication lists in a binder headed for an obscure file cabinet. A
videocassette cannot be filed so easily. Hospitals would have to create a
special storage facility for video recordings, and many hospitals do not have
special locations to house magnetic media. Some hospitals might not even
possess VCRs with which to view the tapes, although recorders are easy and
inexpensive to rent. Perhaps the solution to the filing problem would be a
statutory precept that a transcription of the videotape be incorporated in
the medical records. This written duplicate would be an additional safe-
guard in the event that the videocassette was damaged.
Another obvious barrier to videotaped living wills is the execution man-
date. For centuries, signatures on paper have infused an elevated air of au-
thenticity to contracts, wills, and negotiable instruments. Undoubtedly,
16. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3203 (1986); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189 (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (Supp.
1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2504 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2424 (Supp. 1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 765.06 (West Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-12 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO
CODE § 39-4505 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10-1/, para. 705 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987);
IND. CODE § 16-8-11-13 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.4 (West Supp.
1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-603 (Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.620
(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:7 (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-6(A)
(1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3104 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.055(5)
(1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4590h, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1111(1) (Supp. 1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5257 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:5 (Supp. 1987); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.040 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4 (1985); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 154.05 (West Supp. 1986).
17. ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.020 (1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.4(I) (West Supp.
1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2923(I) (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.020
(Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-104 (1987); UNIF. RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY
ILL ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A. 616 (1987).
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state legislatures enacting videotape living will resolutions would still de-
mand a written execution provision requiring signatures by the declarant
and the witnesses. The question answers itself: merely require that a sworn
execution affidavit accompanies the videotape instrument.
Generally, videotape recordings are considered to be photographs
under evidentiary rules. 18 Under some state provisions, however, videotape
could conceivably be construed as a writing. 9 Indeed, courts have occasion-
ally classified audio recordings and motion pictures as writings." In the
majority of instances, however, audio and videotape recordings will fail to
satisfy the traditional writing requirement in the minds of virtually every
judge or legal scholar.2
V. EVIDENTIARY ELEMENTS
Courts have admitted videotape in criminal proceedings as evidence of
defendants' confessions, 2 police "sting" operations," line-ups, 2 4 and crime
18. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 1001(2); ALASKA R. EVID. 1001(2); ARZ. R. EVYD.
1001(2); ARK. R. EviD. 1001(2); COLO R. EvID. 1001(2); DEL. R. EVD. 1001(2); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.951(2) (West 1979); HAW. R. EvD. 1001(2); IDAHO R. EViD. 1001(2); IOWA R.
EVD. 1001(2); ME. R. EVD. 1001(2); MICH. R. EVD. 1001(2); MINN. R. EVID. 1001(2);
Miss. R. EVID. 1001(2); MONT. R. EVID. 1001(2); N.H. R. EVID. 1001(2); N.M. R. EVD.
1001(2); N.C. R. EVID. 1001(2); N.D. R. EVID. 1001(2); OHIO R. EVID. 1001(2); TEX. R.
EVD. 1001(2); TEX. R. CRIM. EVD. 1001(2); UTAH R. EVID. 1001(2); VT. R. EVID. 1001(2);
WASH. R. EVD. 1001(2); W. VA. R. EVD. 1001(2); Wyo. R. EVID. 1001(2). The Federal
Rules also contain the following definition: "'Writings' and 'recordings' consist of letters,
words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by . . . photographing, magnetic impulse,
mechanical or electronic recording .... " FED. R. EVD. 1001(1). The Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 1(13), employs essentially identical language. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 70 n.22 (E. Cleary 2d ed. Supp. 1978) [hereinafter MCCORMICK'S LAW OF
EVIDENCE].
19. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 250 (West 1966) (writings include "every ... means
of recording upon any tangible thing any form of communication or representation, including
letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof.").
20. See, e.g., Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (motion pictures); People v. Purify, 43 III. 2d
351, 253 N.E.2d 437 (1969) (audio recording); State v. Beach, 304 Minn. 302, 231 N.W.2d
75 (1975) (audio recording). Contra, In re Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983).
21. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 264 Ind. 275, 342 N.E.2d 604 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Balukonis, 357 Mass. 721, 260 N.E.2d 167 (1970).
22. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972); Smith v. State, 272
Ind. 328, 397 N.E.2d 959 (1979); People v. Higgins, 89 Misc. 2d 913, 392 N.Y.S.2d 800
(1977); G. JOSEPH, MODERN VISUAL EVIDENCE § 5.05, at 5-23 to -26 (1984 & Supp. 1987).
Joseph is the Wigmore or Williston of video law, and his is the definitive treatise on legal
applications of videotape.
23. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 146 Ga. App. 815, 247 S.E.2d 540 (1978); Gross v. State,
444 N.E.2d 296 (Ind. 1983); State v. Jeffers, 48 N.C. App. 663, 269 S.E.2d 731 (1980), cert.
denied and appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 724, 276 S.E.2d 285 (1981); G. JOSEPH, supra note
22, § 5.04, at 5-15 to -22.
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scenes.28 Entire criminal and civil trials have been video recorded. 6 Video-
tape depositions,2 7 wills,28 "day-in-the-life" documentaries, 29 and accident
24. See, e.g., Bruce v. State, 268 Ind. 180, 375 N.E.2d 1042, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988
(1978); People v. Heading, 39 Mich. App. 126, 197 N.W.2d 325 (1972).
25. See, e.g., People v. Mines, 132 Il. App. 2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265 (1971); State v.
Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1972); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 5.03, at 5-
11 to -14.
26. G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 3.04, at 3-27 to -33; McCrystal & Maschari, Will
Electronic Technology Take the Witness Stand?, 11 U. TOL. L. REV. 239 (1980); McCrystal,
The Videotaped Trial Comes of Age, 57 JUDICATURE 446, 446 (1974); McCrystal & Young,
Pre-Recorded Videotape Trials - An Ohio Innovation, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 560 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Lucien v. McLennand, 95 F.R.D. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Mills v. Dortch,
142 N.J. Super. 410, 361 A.2d 606 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P'30(b)(4); FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a);
IND. R. TR. P. 30(B)(4); UNIF. AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION ACT §§ 1-10, 12 U.L.A. 9-15
(Supp. 1987); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, §§ 1.03[3], 2.01-3.07, 5.09[2], at 1-1l to -12, 2-1 to
3-39, 5-41 to -44; Murray, Videotaped Depositions: Putting Absent Witnesses in Court, 68
A.B.A. J. 1402 (1982); Annotation, Use of Videotape to Take Deposition for Presentation at
Civil Trial in State Court, 66 A.L.R.3d 637 (1975); Annotation, Admissibility of Videotape
Film in Evidence in Criminal Trial, 60 A.L.R.3d 333 (1974); Annotation, Recording of Testi-
mony at Deposition by Other Than Stenographic Means Under Rule 30(b)(4) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.L.R. FED. 969 (1973).
28. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-5-3(d) (Supp. 1987); N.J. Ass. Res. 3030 (Sept. 11,
1986); Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony - Preventing Frustration of the
Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1983); Buckley, Devising Videotaped Will
Statutes: A Primer, 13 BARRISTER 37 (Spring 1986); Buckley & Buckley, Videotaped Wills,
89 CASE & COM. 3 (Nov.-Dec. 1984); Buckley, Videotaped Will Statutes: The Indiana Exper-
iment, and Other Model Provisions, 2 IN FOCUS, Fall 1986, at 19; Buckley & Buckley, Vide-
otaping Wills: A New Frontier in Estate Planning, 11 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 271 (1984) [herein-
after Buckley & Buckley, Videotaping Wills]; Buckley, Indiana's New Videotaped Wills
Statute: Launching Probate into the 21st Century, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 83 (1985); Nash, A
Videowill: Safe and Sure, 70 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1984, at 87; Nash, The Videotape as a Will:
Valid and Valuable, I IN FOCUS, Summer 1985, at 3.
New York, like most states, has a statute which provides an out-of-court procedure to
"self-prove" a written will without direct testimony of the witnesses. To corroborate the will by
affidavit, witnesses may identify "a court-certified photographic reproduction of the will."
N.Y. S.P.C.A. LAW § 1406(2) (McKinney 1967) (emphasis added). The photographic repro-
duction is deemed an original for purposes of witness verification. Id. This law is designed to
accommodate the use of photostatic copies of wills so that witnesses need not travel to the
courthouse to authenticate the original registered will. However, one could contend that, under
this statute, a court-certified videotape copy could be shown to witnesses to "self-prove" the
written will.
29. See, e.g., Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 73 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D.
Alaska 1977); Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d 1 (1980); Heller, Buchanan
& Bos, Using Videotape to Effectively Prepare and Present Your Case, in LITIGATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE SERIES, VIDEO TECHNIQUES IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 7, 13-15 (F.
Heller ed. 1983); Heller, Buchanan & Bos, Admissability Requirements of Videotape, in LITI-
GATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE SERIES, VIDEO TECHNIQUES IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL,
supra, at 17, 21; G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.06, at 4-40 to -42; Dombroff, Videotape
Evidence: Day in the Life Presentations, 14 THE BRIEF No. 4 (1985), reprinted in 2 IN Focus,
Fall 1986, at 5.
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scenes s° have been awarded statutory and judicial endorsement. Videotape
is certainly no stranger to the courtroom.
Videotape is admissible into evidence under common law principles
comparable to audio recordings, motion pictures, or photographs.3" Like
these predecessors, videotape will be admitted into evidence if relevant, and
some courts require a showing that (1) the videotape recorder was capable
of recording testimony; (2) the video machine operator was competent; (3)
the recording had not been altered; (4) the videotape was appropriately pre-
served; (5) the recording was both visually and audibly clear so as not to be
unintelligible or misleading; (6) the testimony was voluntary; and (7) the
speakers on the videotape can be identified.3"
If introduced as demonstrative evidence, the video recording must be
authenticated by a "live" witness on the stand,"3 and it must be a true and
30. Heller, Buchanan & Bos, Admissability Requirements of Videotape, in LITIGATION
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE SERIES, VIDEO TECHNIQUES IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL, supra
note 29, at 25-28; G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.0411], at 4-28 to -29.
31. Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d I (1980); Paramore v. State, 229
So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); State
v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 (1979); Pratt v. State, 39 Md. App. 442, 387 A.2d 779
(1978); People v. Heading, 30 Mich. App. 126, 197 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1972); State v. Lusk,
452 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Mo. 1970); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (Ct. App.
1972); Williams v. State, 542 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1975); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979); State v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971); G.
JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.02[1], at 4-3; Merlo & Sorenson, Video Tape: The Coming Court-
room Tool, 7 TRIAL, Nov./Dec. 1971, at 56; Annotation, Admissibility of Videotape Film in
Evidence in Criminal Trial, 60 A.L.R.3d 333, 338 (1974).
Many of the precedents cited in this section involved photographs, motion pictures, and
audio recordings. Since identical evidentiary standards most often apply to videotape, these
cases provide guidelines for videotape admissibility.
32. United States v. Neal, 527 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, Robinson v. United
States, 429 U.S. 845 (1976); Popplewell v. State, 269 Ind. 323, 381 N.E.2d 79 (1978); Lewis
v. State, 264 Ind. 288, 342 N.E.2d 859 (1976); State v. Radcliff, 188 Neb. 236, 196 N.W.2d
119 (1972); State v. Yarborough, 55 N.C. App. 52, 284 S.E.2d 550 (1981); G. JOSEPH, supra
note 22, § 4.02, at 4-4 to -8; Buckley & Buckley, Videotaping Wills, supra note 28, at 277;
Elman, The Use of Videotape Evidence in Civil Cases, 19 ALBERTA L. REV. 215 (1981);
Merlo & Sorenson, supra note 31, at 56; Salvan, Videotape for the Legal Community, 59
JUDICATURE 222, 224 (1975); Annotation, Admissibility of Videotape Film in Evidence in
Criminal Trial, 60 A.L.R.3d 333, 338 (1974); Annotation, Authentication or Verification of
Photograph as Basis for Introduction in Evidence, 9 A.L.R.2d 899 (1950 & Supps. 1971,
1983); 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 788 (1967 & Supp. 1987).
These standards were originally established for audio tape recordings. See, e.g., State v.
Williams, 49 Wash. 2d 354, 301 P.2d 769 (1956). However, at least one court has ruled that
the Williams sound recording elements do not control videotape or photographs. State v. New-
man, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971).
A formula comparable to the seven precepts listed above has been employed when video-
taped evidence is utilized for substantive rather than demonstrative purposes. See, e.g., Torres
v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1021 (Ind. 1982); Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. App. 1979).
33. See, e.g., Grimes v. Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D.
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accurate representation of the events portrayed. 3' Generally, videotaped evi-
dence is relevant if it demonstrates that a fact at issue is more or less prob-
able to have occurred as alleged.35 In some cases, judges have considered
photographs relevant if it would have been suitable to admit the depicted
object itself or other evidence of the portrayed circumstances.36
Despite the relevancy of videotaped material, courts may exclude the
evidence if it tends to be unduly prejudicial or inflammatory 3 7 confusing or
misleading to the jury,38 cumulative,3 ' or unnecessarily time-consuming.' 0
Naturally, all of these "fairness factors" must significantly outweigh the
probative value of the videotape. 1 Certain portions of a videotape, if objec-
tionable, may be edited and excluded, while the remaining images are
admitted.42
Alaska 1977); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1972); Richardson v.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (motion picture); State v.
Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.02[4], at 4-
11.
34. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972); Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1958); Grimes v. Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co. of Wis., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130
(1979); People v. Mines, 132 II1. App. 2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265 (1971); Johnson v. State, 272
Ind. 427, 399 N.E.2d 360 (1980); Williams v. State, 271 Ind. 476, 393 N.E.2d 183 (1979);
State v. Woolridge, 2 Kan. App. 2d 449, 581 P.2d 403 (1978); State v. Giles, 253 La. 533, 218
So. 2d 585 (1969); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1972); Pease Co. v.
Local Union 1787, 59 Ohio App. 2d 238, 393 N.E.2d 504 (1978); Richardson v. Missouri-
Kan.-Tex. R.R., 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (motion picture); State v. Newman, 4
Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971).
35. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 401; Grimes v. Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 73
F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.0213][a], at 4-5; MCCORMICK'S
LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 18, § 185, at 437 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
36. See, e.g., Quigley v. Snoddy, 102 III. App. 2d 232, 242 N.E.2d 775 (1968); State v.
Giles, 253 La. 533, 218 So. 2d 585 (1969); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.02[3][a], at 4-5.
37. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID 403; Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir.
1982) (dictum); Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566 (D.S.C. 1979); Pisel v.
Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d I (1980); Williams v. State, 271 Ind. 476, 393
N.E.2d 183 (1979); Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. App. 1979); Butler v.
Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972); O'Neill v. State, 681 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.02[3][b], at 4-5.
38. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566
(D.S.C. 1979); Culpepper v. Volkswagon of Am., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr.
110 (1973); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.02[3][b], at 4-5 to -6.
39. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; Ashley v. Nissan Motor Corp., 321 So. 2d 868 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 323 So. 2d 478 (La. 1975); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.0213][b], at 4-6.
40. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.02[3][b], at 4-6.
41. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403. See also cases and treatises cited supra notes 37-39,
and infra note 42.
42. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 459 N.E.2d 730 (Ind. 1984); Reggio v. Louisiana Gas Ser-
vice Co., 333 So. 2d 395 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 337 So. 2d 526 (La. 1976); Lawton v.
Jewish Hosp., 679 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d
697 (Ct. App. 1972); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.02[3], at 4-7. Cf. Abernathy v. Superior
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The editing menace often arises in attempts to exclude visual evidence.
Since video recordings are particularly jeopardized by erasure, editing can
be achieved with extraordinary ease. Merely copying an original tape onto a
duplicate, and excluding certain segments in the process, can be difficult to
detect.43 Since editing is actually not an issue of admissibility, but rather
addresses the weight and sufficiency of the evidence,4 4 the trial court would
not automatically exclude the videotape simply because it had been edited.
Hearsay assaults are more common with visual evidence. The video
recording itself could be argued to constitute hearsay because it is a
mechanical reproduction of an out-of-court statement offered for the truth
of the matters asserted without an opportunity to cross-examine the declar-
ant.4 5 More often, the contents of the tape are assailed on hearsay grounds.
For instance, "voice-overs" narrating on videotape and question/answer ex-
changes have been held to be hearsay when speech is offered to document
the truth of the words.4 6 Of course, a witness may corroborate the veracity
of the "disembodied voice" through direct testimony. 47 Hearsay objections
to videotape may be overcome through the traditional exceptions. The video
living will could be accepted as "res gestae,"48 present sense impression,
4
1
Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1983) (inadmissibility of sound track); Brewer v.
Jeep Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1147 (W.D. Ark. 1982), affid, 724 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1983) (inclu-
sion of written instructions with video).
43. G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.02131[c], at 4-8; P. UTZ, DO-IT-YOURSELF VIDEO: A
BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO HOME VIDEO 182-91 (1984) [hereinafter P. UTZ]; Telephone conversa-
tion between author and Dr. Peter Utz, Director of Department of Instructional Media,
County College of Morris, Randolph, N.J., Aug. 21, 1987.
44. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Downie, 326 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1964); Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co.
v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1958); State v. Woolridge, 2 Kan. App. 2d
449, 581 P.2d 403 (1978); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.0213], at 4-8.
45. State v. Simon, 174 A. 867 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1934), a.fd, 178 A. 728 (N.J. 1935)
(audio recording); Beyer, supra note 28, at 44.
46. See, e.g., Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985)
(hypnosis question/answer session videotaped); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Cooper, 485 So.
2d 1364 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) (voice-over on videotape); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498
P.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1972) (voice-over on videotape); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.0214][a],
at 4-9 to -10.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 377 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1967) (witness must
identify circumstances surrounding photographed events); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498
P.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1972); G. JOSEPH, supra note 22, § 4.02[4][a], at 4-10.
48. See, e.g., Torres v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1021 (Ind. 1982). "Res gestae" primarily
includes spontaneous statements which modern decisions classify under other exceptions, such
as present sense impression, then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, excited
utterances, and the like. McCORMICK's LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 18, § 288, at 686 (E.
Cleary 2d ed. 1972). Res gestae is a vague and imprecise exception which has stirred the ire of
many commentators. Id. § 288, at 687. "The ancient phrase can well be jettisoned, with due
acknowledgement that it has served well its era in the evolution of evidence law." Id.
49. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(1). For caselaw discussing this exception, see, e.g., Pfeil
v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985); Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341 (D.N.J. 1982);
United States v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779
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then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition,"0 statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, 1 recorded recollection 52 "to
refresh" a living will witness' memory, and business records" (since the
living will is part of the declarant's medical record). Since the patient-de-
clarant, due to her terminal ailment, is incapable of testifying, the video-
tape, introduced either as a living will or as evidence supporting the written
instrument, would satisfy the unavailability and the "all purpose" excep-
tions to hearsay. The "all purpose" exception allows hearsay evidence to be
admitted if the hearsay is more probative than other available evidence, is
sufficiently trustworthy, and entry of the evidence into the record would
best serve the interests of justice."
Perhaps an easier approach to circumvent the hearsay dilemma would
be an alternate application of the video recording as proof other than the
truth of the assertions contained therein. If litigation ensued which chal-
lenged the validity or objectives of a written living will, a video recording of
a living will declaration could be submitted as evidence not of the truth of
the written living will itself, but of the declarant's mental capacity and in-
tent, proper execution of the instrument, or other pertinent issues under
contention. Hearsay is mostly a picket fence through which the attorney
(7th Cir. 1979) (involving audio recording).
50. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(3); MCCORMICK'S LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 18,
§§ 291, 294, at 689-90, 694-96 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). For caselaw analyzing this exception,
see, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892); United States v. Ponticelli,
622 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); United States v. Cosby, 601
F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (in-
volving audio recording).
51. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(4); MCCORMICK's LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 18, §
292, at 690-92 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). For caselaw exploring this exception, see, e.g., Roberts
v. Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1981); Britt v. Corporacion Peruana de Vapores, 506
F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
52. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(5); McCORMICK's LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 18,
§§ 299-303, at 712-16 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). For caselaw interpreting this exception, see,
e.g., United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770-71 (2d Cir. 1965); Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz.
201, 65 P.2d 1141 (1937).
53. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6); McCORMICK's LAW EVIDENCE, supra note 18, §§
304-14, at 717-34 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). For caselaw involving hospital records, physicians'
reports, and this exception, see, e.g., Kuhnee v. Miller, 37 Mich. App. 649, 195 N.W.2d 299
(1972); La Mantia v. Bobmeyer, 382 S.W.2d 455 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Hytha v.
Schwendeman, 40 Ohio App. 2d 478, 203 N.E.2d 312 (1974); Bradley v. Maurer, 17 Wash.
App. 24, 560 P.2d 719 (1977). Cf. McBrady v. State, 460 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 1984) (videotape
business record).
54. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804 (unavailability); Id. 804(b)(5) ("all-purpose" excep-
tion); MCCORMICK'S LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 18, § 324.1 at 95-97 (E. Cleary 2d ed.
Supp. 1978). For caselaw pondering this exception, see, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765
F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1980) (concern-
ing audio recording); United States v. Toney, 599 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Kim, 595 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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may crawl by loosening an occasional slat.
Ultimately, videotaped evidence will be admitted or excluded subject
to sound judicial discretion. 55 The court will evaluate the evidence based
upon the fairness doctrine, relevancy, the balancing test between probative
value and undue prejudice or surprise, hearsay, incomplete foundation, and
similar evidentiary criteria.
Regardless of these evidentiary puzzles, videotape presently may only
be employed to supplement a written living will. In order for a videotaped
living will to function as a separate legal instrument, legislative sanction
will be essential. The following section discusses model video legislation for
living wills.
VI. A MODEL VIDEO LIVING WILL STATUTE
Using the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 5' as an example, a
specific videotape provision could be inserted with reference to the other
terms of the statute. Under Section Two of the Uniform Act,57 the lan-
guage could be amended accordingly (with new portions italicized):
§2. Declaration Relating to Use of Life-Sustaining Treatment.
(a) An individual of sound mind and [18] or more years
of age may execute at any time a declaration gov-
erning the withholding or withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment. The declaration may be made in
writing or videotape recorded.
(1) The declaration, if written, must be
signed by the declarant, or another at
the declarant's direction, and witnessed
by two individuals.
(2) The declaration, if videotape recorded,
must be accompanied by a verified
55. See, e.g., Roberts v. Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1981); Pritchard v. Downie,
326 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1964). Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d I (1980);
State v. Giles, 253 La. 533, 218 So. 2d 585 (1969); Owens v. Thornton, 349 So. 2d 431 (La.
Ct. App. 1977); Reggio v. Louisiana Gas Service Co., 333 So. 2d 395 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 337 So. 2d 526 (La. 1976); Ashley v. Nissan Motor Corp., 321 So. 2d 868 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 323 So. 2d 478 (La. 1975); Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. 163, 450
N.E.2d 190 (1983); Hueper v. Goodrich, 263 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1978); Butler v. Chrestman,
264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972); Lawton v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 679 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1979); O'Neill v.
State, 681 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979); State-
v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971).
56. UNIF. RIGHTS OF TERMINALLY ILL ACT §§ 1-18, 9B U.L.A. 611-23 (1987).
57. Id. § 2, 9B U.L.A. 614 (1987).
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statement, in writing, signed by the de-
clarant, or another at the declarant's
direction, and two witnesses, in which
the declarant and witnesses shall attest
to the truth and the accuracy of the
videotape recording and shall state
that the declarant intends the video-
tape recording to operate as his
declaration.
(3) A written transcription of a videotaped
declaration shall be available to be
made part of the declarant's medical
record.
(4) A videotaped declaration must possess
a soundtrack recording, and the audio
and visual recording must be of a suffi-
ciently clear and intelligible quality as
to be readily comprehended upon
display.
(5) During the videotape recording, the de-
clarant, or another at the declarant's
direction, must recite aloud the entire
contents of the declaration. The con-
tents of the declaration may, but need
not, be in the form expressed in the
subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A declaration may, but need not, be in the following
form:
DECLARATION
If I should have an incurable or irreversible condition
that will cause my death within a relatively short time, and
I am no longer able to make decisions regarding my medi-
cal treatment, I direct my attending physician, pursuant to
the Uniform Rights of the Terminally IIl Act of this State,
to withhold or withdraw treatment that only prolongs the
process of dying and is not necessary to my comfort or to
alleviate pain.
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(c) A physician or other health-care provider who is fur-
nished a copy of the declaration shall make it a part
of the declarant's medical record and, if unwilling to
comply with the declaration, promptly so advise the
declarant.
(1) A videotaped declaration may be made
a part of the declarant's medical record
either by a copy of the videotaped re-
cording or by a written transcription
thereof
Of course, the suggested phrases above must be adapted to each state's
own living will statute.
PRODUCTION CRITERIA AND INHERENT RISKS
Aside from the evidentiary and statutory considerations, the videotap-
ing of living wills involves a myriad of "practical" hurdles which the attor-
ney and client must overcome. Production values, cost, and medium vulner-
ability present perplexing obstacles.
Initially, counsel must decide whether to hire professional videotaping
services or to record "in-house." For many clients, expense may discourage
expert consultation. Although videotaping charges vary geographically, typ-
ical hourly rates range between $40 or $150 nationally. 8 Different video
58. See, e.g., Colorado: $140/1st hr., $55/add'l. hr. Maven Video Productions, Arvada,
Colorado, Aug. 14, 1987 (telephone conversation with author); Hawaii: $150/2 hrs., $65/
add'l. hr. Phil Bergh, C.L.V.S., Hawaii Video Productions, Honolulu, Hawaii, Rate Card,
Aug. 14, 1987 (letter to author); Illinois: $150/1st hr., $35/add'i. hr. Video Data Services,
Oak Park, Illinois, Aug. 14, 1987 (telephone conversation with author); Iowa: Equipment:
$135/ day, $270/day. Labor: $40/1st hr., $20/add'l. hr. David Hellburg, C.L.V.S., Fidelity
Video Services, Inc., Marshalltown, Iowa, Aug. 18, 1987 (telephone conversation with author);
Kentucky: $100/1st hr., $50/add'l. hr. Wilson & Associates, Inc., Louisville, Kentucky, Aug.
14, 1987 (telephone conversation with author); Louisiana: $100/hr. Sharon 0. Kleinpeter Le-
gal Video Service, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Aug. 14, 1987 (telephone conversation with au-
thor); New Jersey: $150/Ist hr., $100/add'l. hr. Ira Goodman, C.L.V.S., Video Data Services,
Union, New Jersey, Aug. 17, 1987 (telephone conversation with author); New York: $100/Ist
hr., $60/add'I. hr. Mill-Lane Productions, Inc., Bayside, New York, 2 IN Focus, Fall 1986, at
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tasks often carry separate price tags. For example, the average "day-in-the-
life" video can be recorded at a special "all-day" price, usually around $500
in many areas.6 Editing and courtroom playback services are gauged be-
tween $22 and $100 per hour.60 These costs may seem steep, but the legal
video industry has become increasingly competitive in recent years, and
charges have gradually declined. In 1983-84, the standard hourly fee in
large metropolitan regions was $185,61 and figures as high as $250 to $300
per hour were not uncommon.62
Professional video companies offer greater flexibility in filming and
production techniques while the "do-it-yourself" approach can result in am-
ateurish efforts. Most law firms lack a sufficient number of video clients to
justify the purchase of sophisticated video equipment. Consumer-grade
video cameras and VCRs may be obtained for less then $300 each, and
although they are primarily designed for family use, recording quality is
quite satisfactory. Lack of production acumen is another headache. Many
law office personnel may be inexperienced in film production techniques and
unfamiliar with the video devices even though modern VCRs and cameras
are extremely simple to operate.6 s "Home movie"-style videotaped deposi-
tions have been criticized as poorly lit, with awkwardly positioned witnesses
or cameras, sloppy make-up, and unsatisfactory recording locations." Cli-
ents deserve and expect more polish for their dollars.
Lawyers opting for the "home-grown" video route must select to rent
2 (advertisement); Texas: $150/2 hrs., $80/lst 1- hr. Video Documentation Services, Inc.,
Dallas, Texas, Aug. 14, 1987 (telephone conversation with author); Virginia: $250/5 hrs.,
$45/add'l. hr. John T. Silver, C.L.V.S., Magnetic Deposition Services, Virginia Beach, Vir-
ginia, Aug. 17, 1987 (telephone conversation with author) [hereinafter by jurisdiction as Video
Companies Price List].
59. See, e.g., Video Companies Price List, Louisiana, supra note 58 ($500/day for
"day-in-the-life" tapes, $600/day for other legal videotaping); Id., Texas ($600/day).
60. For editing costs, see, e.g., id., Colorado ($85/Ist hr., $40/add'l. hr.); id., Hawaii
($50/hr.); id., Illinois ($22.50/hr.); id., Iowa ($60/hr.); id., Kentucky ($35/hr.); id., New
Jersey ($30/hr.); id., Louisiana ($50/hr.); id., Virginia ($30/hr.). For playback costs, see,
e.g., id., Colorado $250/ day); id., Hawaii ($35/hr.); id., Illinois ($35/hr.); id., Iowa
(Equipment: $121/ day, Labor: $40/Ist hr., $20/add'l. hr.); id., Kentucky ($75/Ist hr., $35/
add'l, hr.); id., Louisiana ($50 set-up fee, $50/Ist hr., $30/add'l. hr.); id., New Jersey ($150/
day); id., Virginia ($100/Ist hr., $25/add'l. hr.).
61. McCrystal & Maschari, PRVTT: A Lifeline for the Jury System, 19 TRIAL, March
1983, at 70, 72.
62. See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 28, at 33 [$90 to $250 hourly average]; Indiana Video
Productions, Inc., Rate Card, Feb. 13, 1984 (letter to author); Jupiter Legal Video Services,
Rate Card, March 13, 1984 (letter to author) [$45 to $300 per hour average].
63. Heller, Buchanan & Bos, Using Videotape to Effectively Prepare and Present Your
Case, in LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE SERIES, VIDEO TECHNIQUES IN TRIAL
AND PRETRIAL, supra note 29, at 12; Merlo & Sorenson, supra note 31, at 56.
64. Murray, supra note 27, at 1402; Doret, Trial by Videotape - Can Justice be Seen
to be Done?, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 228, 237 (1974).
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or own among numerous product lines. Video recording equipment is avail-
able in 2-inch VHS and Beta, or A-inch U."' The latter is employed by
most professional video businesses and television stations.6 VHS and Beta
VCRs have inundated the public market and are most affordable, although
the degree of picture resolution is fuzzier than A-inch U. 67 Improved tech-
nologies, however, have lessened the "resolution gap." New Super-VHS and
Ed-Beta formats offer images so sharp that average television sets are inad-
equately sensitive to reproduce the complete signal.6 8
Equipment combinations force further choices. Camera-VCR tandems
are now inexpensive, but less bulky "camcorders" are portable and, thus,
are more convenient to use "in the field." 6 A single camera suffices for
most recording sessions, but multi-camera angles and switching parapher-
nalia may be advantageous in situations in which one camera cannot ade-
quately encompass the entire recording site. Cameras should always include
a zoom lens for close-ups and panoramic shots as well as a time/date gener-
ator which superimposes the time sequence onto the recorded images. This
guards against tampering since erasure or re-recording would clearly dis-
turb the temporal continuity captured on tape.70 VCRs with remote control
and remote microphone capability (for lapel or "boom" microphones) are
another essential. Microphones should be sufficiently mobile to accommo-
date the ambulatory declarant and witnesses.71 Most recorders can function
at various speeds, but the fastest rates produce the clearest picture resolu-
tion. Supplemental illumination of the recording location enhances resolu-
tion and color reproduction, even though modern video cameras are suffi-
ciently photo-sensitive without additional lighting.72  Triangular
65. P. UTZ, supra note 43, at 70-71; Dr. Peter Utz, Director of Department of Instruc-
tional Media, County College of Morris, Randolph, N.J., Video Technology and Equipment,
Lectures before the-Seminar on Videotaping Legal Proceedings, National Network of Legal
Video Companies, Inc., New York City, New York, July II, 1987 [hereinafter Utz Lectures].
66. P. UTZ, supra note 43, at 71; Utz Lectures, supra note 65.
67. Utz Lectures, supra note 65.
68. Id.
69. Interestingly, many professional videotape technicians dislike camcorders and will
not utilize them. Id.
70. Beyer, supra note 28, at 26, 35-36, 49; Murray, supra note 27, at 1405.
71. P. UTZ, supra note 43, at 105; Beyer, supra note 28, at 35; Murray, supra note 27,
at 1405.
72. See P. UTZ, supra note 43, at 152; Doret, supra note 64, at 231; Galluzzo, Bright
Ideas on Correct Lighting: Indoor-Lighting Tips for Your Home Video Movies, HIGH FIDEL-
ITY, Feb. 1981, at A-6; Lachky, How to Light for Video, POPULAR PHOTOGRAPHY, Aug. 1982,
at 100, 186. Additional lighting assists the videotape camera in capturing clearer color signals
to reproduce the recorded event as it actually appeared to the human eye. P. UTZ, supra note
43, at 150; Galluzzo, supra, at A-6; Lachky, supra, at 100, 186. One must be cautious not to
flood the recording site with excessive illumination, as this generates glare and shadows. P.
UTZ, supra note 43, at 153; Galluzzo, supra, at A-8; Lachky, supra, at 186. Video cameras
are also sensitive to different colors of light. Even though room illumination appears white to
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arrangements of three spotlights best illuminate recording subjects and
erase shadows.73
Finally, the recording forum should be carefully selected to accommo-
date visual and auditory concerns. Areas with as little extraneous noise as
possible are ideal. Windows should be isolated from the background since
sunlight tends to blind the camera's photo-monitor which forces it to adjust
to the brightness of the window and, consequently, darken all adjacent ob-
jects. Unquestionably, the "attorney-director" must contemplate an array
of pre-production queries.
Videotape is susceptible to several hazards endangering the integrity of
the medium as a record-keeping device. Erasure, either accidental or delib-
erate, is the primary risk. The contents of videotape may be eliminated
merely by recording over earlier images. Exposure of a videocassette to
strong electromagnetic fields can expunge recorded images. A videotaped
living will, absent a written transcription, could disappear in a flux of mag-
netic pulses.
Intentional erasure is no greater threat to videotaped living wills than
any other tampering would be to a written version. If some unscrupulous
interloper elects to sabotage a living will, either on paper or magnetic tape,
the document is imperiled. Pages can be replaced more easily than recorded
images since the videotaped sequence of events would be obviously dis-
rupted by new pictures or a conspicuous "blank spot" of static. This is par-
ticularly true if a time/date generator is employed. If total annihilation is
the objective, paper is as perishable as videotape, and ultimately ashes of
both are equally indiscernible.
A mischanced erasure, however, presents a threat to videotape which
written instruments avoid. Fortunately, this pitfall has been minimized
thanks to continuing technological improvements. Today's videotape bonds
images so persistently that an immeasurable amount of erasure occurs when
high-intensity magnetic fields come even as close as three inches to the
the casual observer, fluorescent lights emit bluish hues, and incandescent lights tend toward
the reddish end of the spectrum. P. UTZ, supra note 43, at 151. Photoflood bulbs illuminate
with the proper balance of colors for video cameras. Id.
73. Three-light arrangements have been classified as a "key light, fill light and back-
light." P. UTZ, supra note 43, at 154-55; Lachky, supra note 72, at 186. The key light is the
strongest source, usually positioned above the subject at a 45-degree angle on one side of the
camera. The fill light serves to erase shadows. The backlight should be located behind and
above the subject, outside of the camera's field of vision. The backlight illuminates the sub-
ject's contour so that residual shadows fade and the subject "stands out" from the background.
P. UTz, supra note 43, at 154-55; Lachky, supra note 72, at 186. Lighting should be even over
the entire videotape setting, particularly if subjects move during filming. Lachky, supra note
72, at 186. Small, portable spotlights are easiest to arrange and operate. Id. at 186, 192.
1987]
Buckley: Videotaping Living Wills:  Dying Declarations Brought To Life
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1987
60 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tape."' Housing cassettes in plastic containers at least two feet from electri-
cal fixtures or strong magnetic sources should preclude this calamity.
Environmental fluctuations also menace videotape. The ideal surround-
ings for videotape are those that maintain low humidity, minimal dust con-
tamination, and a relatively constant temperature.75 Wherever the video-
tape is stored, temperature and humidity should be kept within + /-5 and
+/-10%, respectively.7 a
For archival storage, such as videotaped wills, cassettes may be victim-
ized by years of dust, humidity, and temperature changes. As is true with
most legal video applications, videotaped living wills would most likely be
replayed within a few weeks or months of original recording. Therefore,
such environmental distress should be minimal, and resulting damage im-
probable. Periodic rewinding of cassettes prevents stretching that occurs
with rising and falling temperature and humidity." Rewinding might be
unnecessary since most tapes presently available have polyester backings
and superior bindings to protect against such concerns.78
VII. CONCLUSION
Living wills attempt to negotiate the treacherous tightrope between the
conflicting goals of individual self-determination and the medical oath to
preserve life whenever possible. The introduction of videotape technologies
will not resolve the moral and ethical issues with which courts, legislatures,
and academicians will continue to struggle. But videotape may expedite and
personalize the living will process, so that the dying declarant may best
express her concerns about terminal medical treatment at a time when de-
clining health prevents normal self-expression. Legislatures should permit
videotape to assist in this cause.
74. R. SARGENT, PRESERVING THE MOVING IMAGE 141 (1974) [hereinafter THE MOV-
ING IMAGE]; 3M Company Magnetic Audio/Video Products Division, The Handling and Stor-
age of Magnetic Recording Tape, RETENTIVITY 2 (Technical Publication No. M-VC-
209(761.5)11) (undated) [hereinafter 3M Technical Publication]. "Protection of the tape from
accidental erasure is of little concern . . . it is unlikely that uncontained magnetic fields strong
enough to cause erasure would be found in ordinary storage or shipping conditions." 3M Tech-
nical Publication, supra, at 2.
75. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COURTS' EQUIPMENT ANALYSIS PROJECT,
AUDIO/VIDEO TECHNOLOGY AND THE COURTS: GUIDE FOR COURT MANAGERS 43, 46 (1977);
C. BENSINGER, THE VIDEO GUIDE 75 (3d ed. 1982); THE MOVING IMAGE, supra note 74, at
139; P. UTZ, supra note 43, at 87; 3M Technical Publication, supra note 74, at 1-2.
76. 3M Technical Publication, supra note 74, at 1. Various air conditioning filters can
alleviate dust contamination. Id.
77. THE MOVING IMAGE, supra note 74, at 139, 141.
78. 3M Technical Publication, supra note 74, at 3.
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